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THROWING CAUTION TO THE WIND: THE  
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, NAFTA AND  
ENVRIONMENTAL PROTECTION IN CANADA
PAUL GUY†
ABSTRACT
According to the precautionary principle, the lack of full scientific cer-
tainty should not preclude measures to prevent environment degrada-
tion. This principle has been incorporated into numerous international 
instruments and is approaching the status of customary international 
law. Moreover, the Canadian government has embraced the princi-
ple and the Supreme Court of Canada recently confirmed it as a ba-
sis of environmental policy in 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société 
dʼ’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town).
This paper examines the ability of the precautionary principle to actu-
ally function as a guide for environmental policy in light of Canadaʼ’s 
international trade obligations. In particular, it considers Canadaʼ’s 
commitments under NAFTA. Under NAFTA a wide array of possible 
government activity can be deemed a “trade barrier” and, under the 
Chapter 11 investment provisions, governments who enact such barri-
ers are subject to binding commercial arbitration. The author critically 
analyzes the reasoning and implications that follow from two recent 
Chapter 11 cases: Ethyl Corporation v. Canada and Metalclad Corpo-
ration v. Mexico. Overall, the author concludes that despite its embrace 
by the international community, the Canadian government and the Su-
preme Court, Canadaʼ’s commitments under NAFTA effectively undercut 
the ability of the precautionary principle to serve as a basis of environ-
mental policy.
† Student-at-Law, WeirFoulds LLP, Toronto, Ontario. I would like to thank John McMurtry 
whose critique of the global free market inspired much of my thinking regarding the issues 
discussed in this paper. This paper was awarded second prize in the 2003 Sir John A. Mactag-
gart Essay Prize in Environmental Law contest sponsored by the Environmental Law Centre, 
Edmonton, Alberta.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Governments around the world are currently confronted with environ-
mental dangers that, while exceedingly difficult to quantify to the degree 
of certainty demanded by formal science, pose potentially catastrophic 
dangers to life on Earth.1 Climate change, ozone depletion, acid rain, 
water pollution, deforestation—the list goes on. Canada is not immune 
to these threats. In fact, Canada is faced with truly unique challenges 
because of its vegetational diversity, northern climate, abundant inherit-
ance of natural resources and vast expanse of land, bordered on three of 
its four sides by oceans. Moreover, because of the countryʼ’s economic 
dependence on its natural resource base, particularly the forestry and 
fisheries industries, ensuring environmental health and vitality is of the 
utmost importance for all Canadians. 
Canadaʼ’s relative economic strength, its stable and developed politi-
cal and legal systems, and its position as an influential middle power 
enable Canada to play a leadership role in the global struggle to meet 
these challenges. Yet despite its enviable position, Canadaʼ’s environ-
mental record is far from inspiring. For instance, a 2001 study com-
paring Canadaʼ’s environmental record with those of the twenty other 
nations in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) showed that Canada ranked only above the United States, 
and was among the worst when ranked by per-capita measurements of 
greenhouse gases and acid-rain causing sulphur-oxide emissions, water 
use, energy consumption and the generation of nuclear waste.2
Canadian courts have recognized the need to mitigate these prob-
lems. According to some, the 2001 decision of the Supreme Court of 
1 In 1992, a statement entitled “World Scientistsʼ’ Warning to Humanity” —which was signed by 
more than sixteen hundred senior scientists from seventy-one countries, including over half of 
all Nobel Prize winners—warned:
Human beings and the natural world are on a collision course. Human activities inflict harsh and 
often irreversible damage on the environment and on critical resources. If not checked, many 
of our current practices put at serious risk the future that we wish for human society and the 
plant and animal kingdoms, and may so alter the living world that it will be unable to sustain 
life in the manner that we know…. A great change in our stewardship of the Earth and life on it 
is required, if vast human misery is to be avoided and our global home on this planet is not to 
be irretrievably mutilated.
Quoted in D. Suzuki, The Sacred Balance (Vancouver: Greystone Books, 1997) at 3-4.
2 M. Mittelstaedt “Environment report ranks Canada near bottom of OECD,” The Globe and 
Mail (11 April 2001).
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Canada in 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société dʼ’arrosage) v. 
Hudson (Town)3 (hereinafter Spraytech) marked a pivotal turning point 
in terms of environmental protection in Canada in that it affirmed the 
power of governments to enact legislation designed to protect public 
and environmental health and, most importantly, endorsed the “precau-
tionary principle” (i.e., that lack of full scientific certainty should not 
preclude measures to prevent environmental degradation) as a basis for 
these policies. Despite this optimism, however, there are several reasons 
to question the positive impact that Spraytech, with its endorsement of 
the precautionary principle, will have on environmental protection in 
Canada. One of the most important considerations in this regard is the 
pressure exerted on Canada by the process of economic globalization 
and the international trade obligations Canada has incurred through its 
participation in the World Trade Organization (OECD)4 and treaties such 
as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).5 
This paper critically examines the efficacy of the precautionary prin-
ciple as a basis of environmental policy in light of Canadaʼ’s internation-
al trade obligations. In particular, it considers Canadaʼ’s commitments 
under NAFTAʼ’s Chapter 11 investment provisions. Under NAFTA a wide 
array of possible government activity could be seen as a “trade barrier” 
and, because of Chapter 11, governments who enact such barriers are 
subject to binding arbitration designed to guarantee the right of private 
moneylenders and investors a return on their investment. Focusing on 
NAFTA and its Chapter 11 investment provisions vis-à-vis environmental 
protection is presently necessary for two reasons. First, NAFTA is argu-
ably the most important of the current institutional arrangements driv-
ing the process of economic globalization in that, with few exceptions, 
it goes farther than any other agreement to protect the interests of pri-
3 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société dʼ’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241 
[Spraytech].
4 See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15 April 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144 
(entered into force 1 January 1995).
5 North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Canada, the Government 
of Mexico and the Government of the United States, 17 December 1992, Can. T.S. 1994 No. 2, 
32 I.L.M. 289 (entered into force 1 January 1994) [NAFTA]. For a detailed consideration of in-
ternational trade law and Canadaʼ’s obligations see M.J. Trebilcock & R. Howse, The Regulation 
of International Trade, 2d ed. (New York: Routledge, 1999); and J.G. Castel et al., The Cana-
dian Law and Practice of International Trade, 2d ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1997).
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vate investors and advance the cause of trade liberalization.6 As a result, 
NAFTA currently serves as a template for ongoing negotiations aimed at 
a new hemispheric trade agreement—the Free Trade Area of the Ameri-
cas (FTAA). Second, several cases involving Chapter 11 have recently 
been decided or resolved. These cases provide an excellent basis upon 
which to analyze the environmental impact of NAFTA and its effects on 
public policy.
In short, the argument of this paper is that despite the Supreme 
Courtʼ’s decision in Spraytech, Canadaʼ’s commitments under Chapter 11 
effectively vitiate the precautionary principle as a basis of environmen-
tal policy. To support this argument, the paper is divided into four sec-
tions. The first provides an overview of the Supreme Courtʼ’s decision 
in Spraytech. The second section considers the precautionary principle 
in more detail—including its history, its scope and its status at interna-
tional law. In the third section, the fundamental principles and obliga-
tions that Canada agreed to by signing NAFTA are discussed. This section 
provides an analysis of Chapter 11ʼ’s investor-state dispute settlement 
provisions and concludes with a review of two Chapter 11 cases: Ethyl 
Corporation v. Canada (hereinafter Ethyl) and Metalclad Corporation 
v. Mexico (hereinafter Metalclad).7 In the final section the efficacy of 
the precautionary principle is critically analyzed in light of Canadaʼ’s 
6 The proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) would have gone further. How-
ever, in April 1998, the OECD decided to suspend efforts to conclude the MAI negotiations 
within the OECD and to pursue agreement and institutionalization of multilateral investment 
measures within the WTO.
7 Mexico v. Metalclad Corp. (2001), 89 B.C.L.R. (3d) 359 [Metalclad] and supplementary judg-
ment Mexico v. Metalclad Corp. (2001), 95 B.C.L.R. (3d) 169 (B.C.S.C.) [Metalclad supple-
mentary]. It should be noted that these two cases are not isolated incidents. Because of the 
secrecy that surrounds the Chapter 11 process there is no way of knowing exactly how many 
Chapter 11 disputes have actually taken place. However, in a recent report Murray Dobbin 
indicates that, as of 2001, fifteen cases had been made public. (M. Dobbin, Briefing Paper, 
“NAFTAʼ’s Big Brother: The Free Trade Area of the Americas and the Threat of NAFTA-style 
ʻ‘Investor-Stateʼ’ Rules” (2001) at 3.) For a comprehensive review of the Chapter 11 cases that 
have been made public see Public Citizen Global Trade Watch & Friends of the Earth, Briefing 
Paper, “NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Cases: Bankrupting Democracy” (Washington, 
September 2001) [“Bankrupting Democracy”]. It should also be noted that many of the pend-
ing cases that have come to light involve potentially astronomical damage awards. The Santa 
Barbara, California based company Sun Belt Water Inc., for instance, has commenced a claim 
against the Canadian government for $14 billion, (“Bankrupting Democracy,” above) on the 
grounds that the provincial ban on the bulk export of water enacted by the government of British 
Columbia in 1993 eliminated any opportunity that the company had to capitalize on the water-
export business in the province.
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Chapter 11 obligations—considering in particular the legal ramifica-
tions of the Ethyl and Metalclad cases.
II. THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADAʼ’S DECISION IN 
SPRAYTECH
The case began in 1991 when the Town of Hudson, Québec, located just 
west of Montreal, adopted By-law 270, restricting the use of pesticides 
to specific locations and essential non-aesthetic situations. Spraytech 
and Chemlawn are both landscaping and lawn care companies who op-
erating mostly in the Montreal area. Each provides services to commer-
cial and residential clients and both regularly utilize a variety of pesti-
cides — all of which are approved by the federal Pest Control Products 
Act.8 In addition, each company held the requisite licences to use the 
pesticides under the provincial Pesticides Act.9
In 1992 Spraytech and Chemlawn were charged with using pesti-
cides in violation of By-law 270. The companies brought a motion ask-
ing the Court to declare By-law 70 ultra vires the Town and/or inopera-
tive on account of its conflict with federal and provincial legislation. 
The motion was denied.10 On appeal, the decision was affirmed by the 
Québec Court of Appeal.11
At the Supreme Court of Canada the original decision was again af-
firmed.12 The Court held that the By-law was not rendered inoperative 
because of the alleged conflict with federal and provincial legislation. 
Moreover, the Court reasoned that based upon the distinction between 
“essential” and “non-essential” uses of pesticides, the Townʼ’s purpose 
in enacting the By-law was to promote the health of its inhabitants. 
This purpose fell squarely under the power granted the Town under the 
Québec Cities and Towns Act.13 Further, the Court found that any re-
strictions on the appellantsʼ’ businesses were necessary incidents to the 
8 R.S.C. 1985, c. P-9.
9 R.S.Q. c. P-9.3.
10 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société dʼ’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town) (1993), 19 M.P.L.R. 
(2d) 224.
11 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société dʼ’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [1998] A.Q. no 
2546.
12  Supra note 3.
13 R.S.Q. c. C-19.
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exercise of this power. The Court also noted that reading the Cities and 
Towns Act in such a way as to permit the Town to regulate pesticide use 
within its territory was consistent with principles of international law 
and policy—and most notably, with the precautionary principle.
III. THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
In simplest terms, the precautionary principle embodies the notion that 
when dealing with potential threats to public and environmental health, 
“itʼ’s better to be safe than sorry.” As such, it recognizes the ability of 
governments to take measures designed to protect the environment from 
potentially serious risks in the absence of scientific certainty regarding 
those risks. As P.S. Puttagunta notes, the basic premise underlying the 
principle is that science cannot sufficiently predict all possible environ-
mental outcomes of human activity and that society cannot afford to 
wait to find out if certain activity carries with it irreversible harm.14
The principle was first articulated in 1968 in the new German air 
pollution Act, Bundesimmissionsschutzgesetz, which came to be a 
centerpiece of German environmental policy in the 1980ʼ’s as the gov-
ernment faced the realization that vast tracts of the countryʼ’s forests 
were dying.15
The Canadian government recently noted in a discussion paper on 
the topic that “two federal statues, two provincial statutes and several 
proposed laws make specific reference to the precautionary principle.”16 
In the words of the discussion paper, the precautionary principle “rec-
ognizes that the absence of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a 
reason to postpone decisions where there is a risk of serious or irrevers-
ible harm.”17
Since its first appearance in Germany in the late 1960ʼ’s the principle 
has sparked an enormous amount of literature and debate. This conver-
14 P.S. Puttagunta, “The Precautionary Principle in the Regulation of Genetically Modified Or-
ganisms” (2000) 9 Health L. Rev. 27 at para. 3.
15 K. von Moltke, “The Dilemma of the Precautionary Principle in International Trade” (1999) 
3 Bridges (ICTSD) 6, online: International Institute for Sustainable Development <http://www.
iisd.org/pdf/precaution.pdf>.
16 Government of Canada, A Canadian Perspective on the Precautionary Approach/Principle 
– Discussion Document (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 2001), at 11 [Discussion Document].
17 Ibid. at 2.
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sation is revealing important variations in terms of the exact contours of 
the principle itself. For example, according to T. Oʼ’Riordan and J. Cam-
eron, the precautionary principle has evolved to encompass a cluster of 
basic ideas—including, inter alia, the propositions that:
• Early preventive action is appropriate even in the absence of 
a scientifically documented need when delay would impose 
increased costs and greater risks of environmental harm;
• It is important that human activities leave the environment 
with wide margins of tolerance to permit natural adaptation to 
human interference. Pushing the edge of the envelope is not a 
good idea; and 
• The onus of proof to demonstrate the environmental feasibility 
of the proposals should be placed upon those who propose 
initiatives, innovations and activities whose environmental 
impact is questionable. In other words, parties seeking to 
engage in potentially harmful activity are faced with a rebuttable 
presumption that the activity should be prohibited.18
Many commentators object to some of the specifics offered by Oʼ’Riordan 
and Cameron.19 What is uncontroversial, however, is the fact that the 
most widely recognized statement of the precautionary principle is Prin-
ciple 15 of the Rio Declaration,20 which states:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach 
shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of 
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.
18 T. Oʼ’Riordan & J. Cameron, Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (London: Earthscan 
Publications, 1994) at 16-18.
19 For example, the Canadian Chemical Producersʼ’ Association (CCPA) objects to the 
notion that the precautionary principle entails a rebuttable presumption that the activ-
ity in question should be prohibited. See “CCPA Response to ʻ‘A Canadian Perspective 
on the Precautionary Approach/Principle Discussion Document – September 2001ʼ’” at 
6 ff. Online: CCPA <http://www.ccpa.ca/english/position/enviro/PrecautionaryPaper-
Response.doc>.
20 Annex I of the Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 
Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992, A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) (12 August 1992).
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As noted in a recent discussion document on the precautionary princi-
ple, the Canadian government supports the statement in Principle 15 of 
the 1992 Rio Declaration.21 Furthermore, it notes:
[The] language, and the approach it [Principle 15] represents, is 
consistent with Canadian practice in the field of environmental 
protection, and the approach is increasingly reflected in Canadian 
environmental legislation, such as the Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act. Canada also has a long-standing history of 
implementing the precautionary approach in science-based programs 
of health and safety, and natural resources conservation.22
Based upon Principle 15, the following three propositions could be said 
to form the essential core of the precautionary principle:
(1) If the expected harm from an action or product is serious or 
irreversible; and
(2) If the scientific forecasting of the expected harm is reasonably 
uncertain; then
(3) Cost-effective measures to anticipate and/or prevent the harm 
are justifiable.23
1. The Status of the Precautionary Principle at International Law
As will be discussed below, dispute settlement mechanisms contained 
in Chapter 11 do not permit NAFTA Tribunals to make reference to the 
domestic laws of the parties involved. As a result, any recourse to the 
precautionary principle in a Chapter 11 dispute would have to be made 
relying upon the principleʼ’s status at international law.
The most frequently cited authority on the sources of international 
law is Article 38 of the International Court of Justice Statute which stip-
ulates, inter alia, that “international law” is comprised of: (1) general 
and particular international conventions that establish rules expressly 
21 Discussion Document, supra note 16 at 2.
22 Discussion Document, supra note 16 at 2.
23 Even with these three core principles there is still plenty of room for disagreement regard-
ing the exact meaning of phrases such as “serious or irreversible,” “reasonably uncertain,” and 
“cost-effective.”
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recognized by the contesting states; (2) international custom, as evi-
dence of a general practice accepted as law; (3) the general principles 
of law recognized by civilized nations; and (4) as subsidiary means for 
the determination of rules of international law, judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations.
The two most important sources of international law are undoubt-
edly international conventions and international custom. As far as con-
ventional law is concerned, the precautionary principle has appeared 
in over twenty international laws, treaties, protocols and declarations 
as of 200024—including the 1987 Protocol in Substances that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer (“the Montreal Protocol”), the 1984 Conference on 
the Protection of the North Sea, the 1992 Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, the United Nationsʼ’ Agreement on Straddling and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, the 1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration 
on Sustainable Development in the Economic Commission for Europe 
Region, the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity, the 1990 Bang-
kok Declaration on Environmentally Sound and Sustainable Develop-
ment in Asia and the Pacific, and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environ-
ment and Development.25 Indeed, Freestone and Hey have documented 
the principleʼ’s inclusion “in virtually every recently adopted treaty and 
policy document related to the protection and preservation of the envi-
ronment.”26
While the precautionary principle is found in many international 
documents, there are three important qualifications that need to be noted 
for the purposes of this paper. First, of the more than twenty documents 
that invoke the precautionary principle, many “declarations” (e.g., the 
Rio Declaration) do not create binding international legal obligations 
per se. Second, unlike customary international law, conventional inter-
national law is only binding on those states that have signed and ratified 
24 K.J. Barrett, Canadian Agricultural Biotechnology: Risk Assessment and the Pre-
cautionary Principle (Doctoral Thesis, Botany, University of British Columbia, 1999) 
[unpublished] at 51. Cited in Puttagunta, supra note 14 at para. 3. 
25 Ibid. at para. 5.
26 D. Freestone & E. Hey, “Origins and Development of the Precautionary Principle” in D. Free-
stone & E. Hey, eds., The Precautionary Principle and International Law (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 1996) at 41.
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the treaty in question. And, finally, in the case of NAFTA itself, the precau-
tionary principle is nowhere mentioned in the text of the treaty.27
Customary international law, in contrast, creates much wider legal 
obligations in that it is binding on each and every state.28 In order to 
establish that a given rule is binding as customary international law it 
must be established that (a) there is general and uniform state practice 
upholding the rule; (b) this practice is accompanied by opinio juris (i.e., 
the conviction by states that their actions are required as a matter of 
law). 
According to most commentators, the precautionary principle is ap-
proaching the status of an international customary norm, but still falls 
short due to insufficient state practice.29 For example, as noted by the 
Supreme Court in Spraytech, the Supreme Court of India considers the 
precautionary principle to be a customary international norm.30 Yet Can-
adaʼ’s position is just the opposite.
The precautionary principle/approach appears in a large number of 
international instruments, and Canadaʼ’s obligations in that regard 
are governed by its expression in those instruments. Due to an 
absence of clear evidence of uniform State practice and opinio juris, 
Canada does not yet consider the precautionary principle to be a rule 
of customary international law.31
Interestingly, Lʼ’Heureux-Dubé J., for the majority in Spraytech, came 
very close to accepting that the principle was a customary norm. She 
27 Chapter 21 of NAFTA states that the General Exceptions contained in Article XX of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs And Trade [GATT] 30 October 1947, 58 U.N.T.S. 187, Can. T.S. 
1947 No. 27 (entered into force 1 January 1948) apply. Article XX (b) states that nothing in 
the GATT shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement of any measure necessary 
to protect human, animal or plant life or health. Nonetheless, the precautionary principle is 
mentioned nowhere in the GATT and the case law suggests that it does not fall under the Article 
XX(b) exception.
28 States can, of course, always declare that they object to a particular customary rule. The effect 
of such a declaration is a complex question that is beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice to say 
that, like customary international itself, the answer will depend, in large part, upon the reaction 
of other states.
29 Cf., for example, O. McIntyre & T. Mosedale, “The Precautionary Principle as a Norm of 
Customary International Law” (1997) 9:2 J. Enviro. L. 221.
30 A.P. Pollution Control Board v. Nayudu, 1999 S.O.L. Case No. 53, at p.8; and Vellore Citizens 
Welfare Forum v. Union of India, [1996] Supp. 5 S.C.R. 241. Cited by the S.C.C. in Spraytech, 
supra note 3 at para. 32.
31 Discussion Document, supra note 16 at 10.
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wrote: “As a result, there may be ʻ‘currently sufficient state practice to 
allow a good argument that the precautionary principle is a principle of 
customary international law.ʼ’”32 In their concurring opinion, the minor-
ity simply ruled that references to international sources had “little rel-
evance” to the questions at issue.33
IV. NAFTAʼ’S CHAPTER 11 INVESTMENT PROVISIONS
1. NAFTAʼ’s Fundamental Principles
Chapter 11 of NAFTA deals with “investment” and covers a much broader 
range of economic activity than what conventionally would fall under the 
rubric of “international trade.” As opposed to “trade,” “investment” has 
no necessary connection to the export or import of any good or service. 
Under NAFTA, “investment” is a very broad category that includes things 
such as incorporated and non-incorporated businesses, shareholdings, 
loans made to foreign companies for more than three years, real estate, 
intellectual property and goodwill.34 Furthermore, investment refers not 
only to present property interests, but also includes those that are merely 
expected so that both present and projected profits are included.35
In short, NAFTAʼ’s investment provisions establish a set of legally en-
forceable rules that make it safer and easier for foreign investors to en-
sure return on their investments. In doing so, Chapter 11 takes several 
of the key principles of trade liberalization that are typically applied to 
32 Spraytech, supra note 3 at para. 32 [emphasis added]. One of the reasons behind the majorityʼ’s 
reluctance to endorse the precautionary principle as a binding rule at customary international 
law was no doubt the fact that under Canadian constitutional law an adoptionist approach is 
taken vis-à-vis customary international law whereby it is presumptively part of the common law 
unless there is an explicit legislative intention to the contrary. Reference Re Powers Of Ottawa 
(City) and Rockfcliffe Park, [1943] S.C.R. 208 (sub nom. Foreign Legations Case). As noted by 
the federal government in its discussion document, Discussion Document, supra note 16 at 10:
If the precautionary principle were to attain such a status [i.e., a rule of customary international 
law], it would automatically become part of Canadian domestic law, unless a contrary domestic 
statute exists. To what extent this would significantly affect current Canadian law, either as a 
substantive and/or an interpretive rule, is unclear and should be considered further.
33 Spraytech, supra note 3 at para. 48.
34 NAFTA, supra note 5 at Article 1139.
35 NAFTA, supra note 5 at Article 1139(g).
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trade in goods and services—principles that were first recognized in the 
international arena in the GATT36 — and applies them to foreign invest-
ment.37 These principles include:
National Treatment: Foreign investors and investments must be treated 
no less favourably than domestic ones. Thus both formal and substan-
tive rules cannot be structured to give an advantage to local companies. 
Any form of discrimination between domestic and foreign investors is 
prohibited unless there is a specific exemption contained in NAFTA.38
Most Favored Nation Treatment: The best treatment that is given to any 
investor from a non-NAFTA country must also be given to all NAFTA coun-
try investors.39
Minimum International Standards of Treatment: NAFTA governments 
must ensure that basic international rights (e.g., following treaty obliga-
tions in good faith and providing due process and equitable treatment) 
are afforded to all investors and investments.40
Strict Limitations on Performance Requirements: Performance require-
ments, which encompass a broad array of possible government regula-
tory activity designed to benefit a particular area or group (e.g., local 
hiring quotas or requiring that firms use a minimum level of local mate-
rials or services) are strictly limited and in many cases prohibited.41
Protection Against Expropriation: Expropriation refers to any act where 
a government denies a human or corporate person any benefit of a prop-
erty holding. NAFTA guarantees that full, swift and fair compensation will 
36 Supra note 27.
37 These principles are primarily articulated in NAFTA, supra note 5 at Articles 1102-1113.
38 NAFTA, supra note 5 at Article 1102.
39 NAFTA, supra note 5 at Article 1103.
40 NAFTA, supra note 5 at Article 1105.
41 NAFTA, supra note 5 at Article 1106.
42 NAFTA, supra note 5 at Article 1110.
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be paid to all affected parties after any expropriation occurs.42 Further-
more, NAFTA includes an expansive definition of “expropriation.”43
In signing on to NAFTA, Canada, the U.S. and Mexico agreed to pro-
tect international investments and investors by upholding these princi-
ples. Furthermore, under the agreement all these obligations apply to 
national governments, sub-national governments (e.g., state, provincial 
and local)44 and all government entities. To ensure that these obligations 
will be upheld, the three countries also agreed to implement a com-
pletely unique investor-state dispute settlement process.
2. Investor-State Dispute Settlement Under Chapter 11
All NAFTA investors are entitled to dispute any “measure” (i.e., “any law, 
regulation, procedure, requirement or practice”45) enacted by a foreign 
government that is party to the agreement that violates a NAFTA provi-
sion. Based upon the particular facts in each dispute, and the wishes of 
the aggrieved investor, arbitration panels established under Chapter 11 
are governed by the arbitration mechanisms set out by one of the World 
Bankʼ’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
43 According to its standard legal definition, “expropriation” is normally limited to the gov-
ernment power of “eminent domain,” namely, “[t]he power of a government entity to convert 
privately owned property, especially land, to public use, subject to reasonable compensation for 
the taking.” Blackʼ’s Law Dictionary (Pocket Edition), 1996, s.v. “eminent domain.” As a result 
of corporate pressure, however, this standard definition was slowly modified in the U.S. by a se-
ries of decisions handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court. Using the Fifth Amendment (which, 
inter alia, protects against the taking of private property for public use without just compensa-
tion), the Court has held that “expropriation” also includes “regulatory takings” —which covers 
any law, regulation, rule or policy that reduces the commercial value of an investment or the 
expected profits from the investment. See M. Dobbin, Briefing Paper, “NAFTAʼ’s Big Brother: 
The Free Trade Area of the Americas and the Threat of NAFTA-style ʻ‘Investor-Stateʼ’ Rules” 
(2001) at 2. And while “expropriation” is not explicitly defined in NAFTA, Article 1110 refers 
to “direct expropriation,” “indirect expropriation” and “measures tantamount to expropriation” 
—language which indicates that the wider U.S. conception of “expropriation” has been incorpo-
rated into the agreement. This interpretation was confirmed by the B.C.S.C. in the recent appeal 
of the Tribunal decision in Mexico v. Metalclad Corp., supra note 7.
44 For a recent discussion of the constitutionality of Chapter 11 panel awards levied against 
provinces see M.A. Luz, “NAFTA, Investment and the Constitution of Canada: Will the Water-
tight Compartments Spring a Leak?” (2000-2001) 32 Ottawa L. Rev. 35. Overall, Luz argues 
that a province could be legally compelled under Canadian law to pay an arbitration award if 
that province were found responsible for the treaty violation—this despite the fact that the prov-
inces (or other sub-national entities) are not party to NAFTA.
45 NAFTA, supra note 5 at Article 201.
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(ICSID),46 the ICSID Additional Facility47 or the United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Arbitration Rules.48 Regard-
less of the arbitration rules employed, however, the process is conducted 
under the legal framework set out in NAFTA and tribunals make no refer-
ence to the statutory or constitutional laws of the targeted nation.
NAFTA tribunals typically have three trade lawyers appointed as pan-
elists. Normally the aggrieved investor and the foreign government each 
nominate a panelist, and then the two appointees jointly select the third 
member. All aspects of the subsequent arbitration are kept completely 
secret and access to all documents, transcripts and proceedings is strictly 
limited to the two disputing parties. Furthermore, governments that are 
party to NAFTA but not involved in the dispute do not have the automatic 
right to appear before the tribunal. Instead, a government must apply 
for intervenor status if it wishes to participate. In general, no one other 
than the disputing investor and the NAFTA parties have any right to take 
notice of a foreign investor claim, access pleadings or evidence, provide 
input, or even observe, the proceedings. Even publication of the final 
award is not guaranteed. Governments have the discretion to release a 
tribunalʼ’s final award, but they are not under any obligation to do so. 
The only way that concerned citizens or the press can attend tribunal 
hearings is if all the parties to the dispute consent—something that has 
not yet happened.
Once the tribunal makes a decision it can award monetary damages 
to an aggrieved investor. While a Chapter 11 panel cannot strike down 
NAFTA-inconsistent measures directly, it can order a country to change 
any infringing measure. Finally, there is no appeal procedure for disput-
ing a tribunal award and all awards can be directly enforced through the 
domestic courts of all state parties.49
46 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States, 19 March 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 4 I.L.M. [ICSID Convention].
47 Online: World Bank <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/facility.htm> (date accessed 5 
November 2002). These rules apply in cases where only one party to the dispute is a signatory 
to the ICSID Convention. Mexico is currently not a signatory.
48 UN GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1976) at 46.
49 See e.g., J.A. VanDuzer, “Investor-State Dispute Settlement Under NAFTA Chapter 11: The 
Shape of Things to Come?” (1997) Can. Y.B. Intʼ’l L. 263 at 276-289.
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3. Two Chapter 11 Cases
i. Ethyl Corporation v. Canada
In April 1997 Parliament passed the Manganese-based Fuel Additives 
Act50 which imposed a ban on the import and interprovincial transport 
of the gasoline additive methylcyclopentadienyl manganese tricarbonyl 
(MMT) – an additive that had been used in gasoline in Canada since 1977. 
MMT is put into gasoline to enhance its octane level, improve fuel com-
bustion and reduce engine “knocking.” The ban was enacted in response 
to public health concerns: scientific evidence suggests that MMT is a neu-
rotoxin that enters the body through the lungs and causes nerve damage 
which can lead to psychosis, memory loss and premature death.51 Not 
surprisingly, MMT had been banned for use in reformulated gasoline in 
the United States and in Europe, and in 1997 Canada was the only coun-
try in which MMT was still being used.
In 1997 the only remaining producer of MMT was the Virginia-based 
Ethyl Corporation, which exported to its Canadian subsidiary, Ontario-
based Ethyl Canada Inc., where MMT was mixed and then sold to Cana-
dian gasoline refiners. Six months before the ban was enacted, while 
parliamentarians were still debating its merits, Ethyl filed a notice of 
intent to submit a claim under Chapter 11 if a ban were imposed. Fur-
thermore, Ethyl claimed that various statements made by the Minister of 
the Environment, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister and other 
unnamed individuals during the public debate that had taken place over 
the safety of MMT had already “created distrust of Ethyl, Ethyl Canada 
and the product MMT within the environmental groups and the media 
thereby damaging Ethylʼ’s goodwill around the world.”52
50 S.C. 1997, c. 11. The Act was first introduced in June 1995, received Royal Assent on April 
25, 1997 and came into force on June 24, 1997. See section 21 of the Act.
51 See e.g., J. McEachern & C. Shaw, “MMT – NAFTAʼ’s Potentially Lethal Legacy: Lifting of 
MMT Ban is Not Justified by Lack of Scientific Proof” The CCPA [Canadian Centre for Policy 
Alternatives] Monitor (November 1998); Council of Canadians, News Release, “Gasoline Ad-
ditive and NAFTA Threaten Canadiansʼ’ Health, Scientists and Groups Warn” (4 November 
1998).
52 Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada, (Notice of Intent) at paras. 10, 16, 17, 20 and 
21; Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada, (Notice of Arbitration) at paras. 59 and 60. 
Because of the secrecy surrounding Chapter 11 tribunals these two notices are not publicly 
available. However, they are cited in Ethyl Corporation v. Government of Canada, (Statement 
of Defence) at 7, online: “NAFTA Cases: Ethyl Corporation,” Appleton & Associates Interna-
tional Lawyers <http://www.appletonlaw.com/4b1ethyl.htm>. 
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Five days after the ban was enacted Ethyl filed a claim against the 
Canadian government for US$251 million in damages—which was, ac-
cording to the ICSID, the highest claim for damages ever filed in an inves-
tor-state proceeding.53 Ethylʼ’s action marked the first time that a NAFTA 
investor had used Chapter 11ʼ’s investor-state provisions directly to chal-
lenge regulatory action of a foreign government. In its claim Ethyl al-
leged that the Canadian ban was an illegal restriction on the companyʼ’s 
business and expected profits. Specifically, Ethyl argued that Canada 
breached its obligations under three NAFTA provisions: Article 1102 (na-
tional treatment), Article 1106 (ban on performance requirements) and 
Article 1110 (protection against expropriation).
In July 1998 the Government, worried about the very real possibility 
of losing the case and the millions of dollars that could potentially be 
awarded by a NAFTA tribunal, settled the dispute with Ethyl out of court. 
According to the terms of the settlement, the government revoked the 
ban on MMT, paid US$13 million in damages and legal fees, and issued 
a statement for later use in Ethyl advertising saying, contrary to scien-
tific studies and the existence of bans already in place in the U.S. and 
Europe, that it lacked any evidence that MMT was dangerous to human 
health.
ii. Metalclad Corporation v. Mexico
In 1993 California-based Metalclad Corporation bought an abandoned 
hazardous waste disposal site in Guadalcazar, an impoverished and re-
mote area with no developed infrastructure and limited resources in the 
Mexican state of San Luis Petosi. The company planned to expand and 
re-open the facility and then haul toxic waste and other hazardous mate-
rials to the dump—despite the fact that the site had a history of contami-
nating the local water supply and that more than 20,000 tons of waste 
had already been illegally dumped at the site without proper treatment.
After it purchased the facility, however, Metalcladʼ’s plans were 
thwarted when the state government informed the company that it could 
not expand or re-open the dump without municipal and state approval. 
In May 1994, ignoring the state warning, Metalclad began work on the 
siteʼ’s expansion. In June and November of 1994 Metalclad ignored of-
53 Public Citizen Global Trade Watch, Briefing Paper, “Ethyl Corporation vs. Government of 
Canada: Now Investors Can Use NAFTA to Challenge Environmental Safeguards” (1997) at 2.
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ficial orders to cease construction. Finally, in January 1997 negotiations 
resulted in an agreement that permitted the company to operate a non-
hazardous waste disposal facility on the site, but with the stipulation of 
ongoing public consultations and negotiations.
Throughout the period of 1993-1997 hundreds of local residents, 
still worried about previous water contamination, protested against re-
opening the facility. In September 1997 an environmental impact as-
sessment revealed that the site was situated atop an ecologically sen-
sitive underground alluvial stream. This confirmed earlier suspicions 
that the facility was responsible for the widespread contamination of 
the local water supply. In response to this finding the state declared the 
site part of a special 600,000-acre ecological zone—a move that effec-
tively prevented Metalclad from re-opening the dump. As a result, the 
company used Chapter 11 to sue the Mexican government for US$ 90 
million—a figure that was more than the combined annual income of 
all the residents in the surrounding community. In its claim Metalclad 
argued that the actions of the municipal and state governments violated 
the companyʼ’s right to future profits on its investment (Article 1110 of 
NAFTA) and its right to treatment according to minimum international 
standards (Article 1105 of NAFTA).
In August 2000 a NAFTA tribunal awarded US$ 16,685,000 in damag-
es against the national government of Mexico, ruling, inter alia, that (1) 
it was improper for the local and state governments to deny Metalclad 
a permit to operate the facility based on environmental or public health 
considerations, public opposition or the past performance of the facil-
ity; and (2) the national government was liable for the damage award. In 
so doing, the tribunal ruled that Mexico had unjustifiably expropriated 
Metalcladʼ’s investment even though construction on the site was never 
finished and the facility itself was never operational.
While there is no appeal procedure provided under Chapter 11, it is 
possible, depending upon the location chosen for the arbitration, to ap-
ply for limited third party judicial review of international commercial 
arbitration awards. Since Vancouver was selected to host the arbitration 
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in this instance, Mexico applied to have the tribunalʼ’s decision reviewed 
by the British Columbia Supreme Court.54
In May 2001 the Court upheld the tribunalʼ’s award. In his decision, 
Tysoe J. commented that the tribunal, in ruling that the Mexican state 
of San Luis Petosi expropriated Metalcladʼ’s investment in the facility 
when the state created the protected ecological preserve, implied an 
“extremely broad definition of expropriation.”55 However, due to the 
very limited scope of the review, Tysoe J. held that the Court had no 
authority to overturn the expropriation finding since it was not “patently 
unreasonable.”56
V. NAFTAʼ’S CHAPTER 11 AND THE PRECAUTIONARY 
PRINCIPLE
Both the Ethyl and Metalclad cases vividly demonstrate, on a number 
of levels, the extent to which Chapter 11 effectively undercuts use of 
the precautionary principle as a basis for public policy. In short, the 
precautionary principle dictates that when faced with expected serious 
or irreversible harm, governments should enact cost-effective measures 
to anticipate and/or prevent that harm. In many instances, however, as in 
the Ethyl and Metalclad cases, such measures will be deemed an unjusti-
fied expropriation of international investorsʼ’ NAFTA-guaranteed rights to 
profit from the use of environmentally harmful products and practices.
Chapter 11 has, in other words, resulted in a massive restriction on 
the ability of governments to legislate in ways that protect human health 
and ensure environmental vitality and sustainability. Government ac-
tion that infringes on the rights of private investors to receive returns 
on their investment is deemed expropriatory and therefore illegal under 
the agreement. Simply put, using the precautionary principle to ensure 
a healthy, clean and safe environment does not enable private inves-
tors to maximize return on their investments. As a result, such policies 
54 See Metalclad, supra note 7; Metalclad supplemental, supra note 7. The Metalclad decision 
was the first Chapter 11 tribunal decision to ever be subjected to third party judicial review. 
Nonetheless, neither Mexico nor Metalclad challenged the jurisdiction of the B.C.S.C to con-
duct the review. Metalclad, supra note 7 at para 39.
55 See supra note 43.
56 Metalclad, supra note 7 at para 100.
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are deemed “trade restrictive” and therefore prohibited. This follows in 
perfect conformity to the logic of economic globalization underlying 
NAFTA. As University of Manitoba economics professor Robert Cherno-
mas explains: 
For the vast majority of firms not engaged in profit-making from this 
sector, health care [or environmental protection] is an input without 
any output. It is an expense that does not serve the ʻ‘bottom-line,ʼ’ 
like adding more steel to the car or workers to the assembly line than 
are necessary to produce the standard industry car.57
It is also striking to note that in both the Ethyl and Metalclad cases there 
is an underlying presupposition that private corporations and investors 
have a pre-existing claim on public property. In the Ethyl case there is 
an assumption that Ethyl has property claims over the environment and 
the actual physical bodies of people in Canada. It is undisputed that 
when MMT is used in gasoline it is emitted into the air and then absorbed 
into the bodies of those who come into contact with the emissions, re-
sulting in potentially severe health complications.58 Yet Ethyl was able 
to recover damages in the case because the Canadian government rec-
ognized that under NAFTA, by virtue of its investment, Ethyl suddenly 
had an enforceable property claim over the use and control of both the 
environment and the bodily health of the Canadian public. 
Similarly, in the Metalclad case the company was assumed, simply 
on account of its investment, to have a property claim to the under-
ground alluvial stream, the far-reaching areas that the stream serves and, 
again, the physical and environmental health of the people in the local 
community. These cases would not have unfolded as they did without 
the key assumption that private ownership, by virtue of private invest-
ment, extends to things which most people would agree are either in-
violable (e.g., their own bodies) or clearly public property (e.g., the en-
vironment). Most importantly, the assumption that private investment 
can carry with it ownership rights over things such as the environment 
57 R. Chernomas, The Social and Economic Causes of Disease (Ottawa: The Canadian Centre 
for Policy Alternatives, 1999) at 15-16.
58 See e.g., J. McEachern & C. Shaw, “MMT – NAFTAʼ’s Potentially Lethal Legacy: Lifting of 
MMT Ban is Not Justified by Lack of Scientific Proof” The CCPA [Canadian Centre for Policy 
Alternatives] Monitor (November 1998); Council of Canadians, News Release, “Gasoline Ad-
ditive and NAFTA Threaten Canadiansʼ’ Health, Scientists and Groups Warn” (4 November 
1998).
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necessarily entails that application of the precautionary principle be se-
verely constrained. 
Another troubling aspect of these two cases is that NAFTA stipulates 
this extraordinary extension of private ownership to foreign investors be 
granted cost-free. For example, Metalclad had to make an initial capi-
tal investment in the Guadalcazar site as a precondition to launching a 
Chapter 11 action. However, once the environmental assessment was 
completed and the environmental consequences associated with the site 
made clear, there was absolutely no question as to whether Metalclad 
retained a claim to the profits it expected from its investment. This was, 
in effect, the bottom line of the case: under NAFTA, Metalcladʼ’s claim on 
its anticipated profits was in no way affected by the subsequent finding 
that its investment was going to have an enormously negative impact on 
the surrounding environment. There was no suggestion that since Met-
alclad was permitted to enjoy a property entitlement over the disposal 
site, alluvial stream, surrounding environment and bodily health of the 
local residents, that Metalclad should be forced to pay for this right or 
held liable for any health or environmental problems that resulted from 
its investment.
Similarly, Ethyl Corporation was allowed to produce and sell MMT, 
which is directly damaging to human and environmental health, without 
having to contribute towards paying the associated costs. As a foreign 
company, Ethyl will not contribute to the tax revenues that undoubtedly 
will be required to clean up the environment and address the health 
problems caused by MMT. Instead, the Canadian public will pay for all 
the resulting damage. Thus, not only does NAFTA afford private investors 
a massive cost-free expansion of property entitlements, but the effects 
of this recognition are paid for by the same public that is injured. In the 
end, all the benefits which result from NAFTAʼ’s Chapter 11 investment 
provisions protect and enable private investors to make cost-free returns 
on investment, with absolutely no liability attached for any of the ensu-
ing negative consequences for public health or the environment.
Finally, it is important to note that several commentators have pre-
dicted that these two cases will have a “chill effect”59 Private investors 
and corporations can use Chapter 11 lawsuits, and the threat of such law-
59 See e.g., T. Clarke & M. Barlow, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment and the Threat to 
Canadian Sovereignty (Toronto: Stoddart, 1997) at 42.
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suits, to constrain the policy options of democratically-elected lawmak-
ers. Many governments inevitably will become increasingly unwilling 
to enact a wide range of public policies (e.g., measures aimed at protect-
ing human and environmental health on the basis of the precautionary 
principle) on account of the potential liability that those policies could 
attract under the new rules of international trade law, including NAFTAʼ’s 
Chapter 11. This chill effect will constrain government action despite 
the fact that affected measures are intended to protect the public interest 
or may have been central to the governmentʼ’s electoral success.
The Ethyl case is a quintessential example of the chill effect. Yet in 
response to criticism, David Wilson, President of Ethyl Canada, denied 
that the chill effect was a problem and stated: “Obviously the govern-
ment can do what it wants to do, but when something is being taken 
away from you, there should be some form of compensation.”60 This 
sentiment was echoed in the Metalclad case by Clyde C. Pearce, the 
lawyer representing Metalclad: “[T]here is nothing stopping these gov-
ernments from [enacting a NAFTA-inconsistent public policy] as long as 
they pay for it.”61 
Despite these reassurances, however, these rejoinders to the threat 
posed by the chill effect are misplaced for two reasons. First, as dis-
cussed above, they unjustifiably presuppose that private investors have 
a right to the exclusive, cost-free benefit of public property, and that this 
right should be protected at the expense of any others. Second, they fail 
to account for the fact that by demanding multi-million (and even bil-
lion62) dollar compensation packages, Chapter 11-type claims effective-
ly tie the hands of governments whose budgets cannot accommodate the 
possibility of such large damage awards.
It is difficult accurately to assess the extent to which this program 
of self-censorship has already befallen NAFTA governments, since draft 
legislation can be dropped or amended long before the public takes no-
60 Appleton & Associates International Lawyers, News Release, “U.S. Company Files Notice to 
Seek $200 Million in Claim Against the Government of Canada” (7 October 1996).
61 A. DePalma “Mexico Is Ordered to Pay a U.S. Company $16.7 Million” New York Times, (31 
August 2000).
62 California-based Sun Belt Water Inc. has launched an action against the Canadian government 
for $14 billion in damages—on the grounds that a British Columbia ban on bulk water exports 
constituted illegal expropriation under the terms of NAFTA. See e.g., “Bankrupting Democ-
racy”, supra note 7.
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tice. What is clear, though, is that the possibility of this chill effect is 
very real. In fact, attorneys representing Ethyl were quite frank about 
the precedent the case established for future Chapter 11 actions against 
NAFTA governments: “[T]he potential for lawsuits under this process 
[i.e., Chapter 11] is far-reaching since it could be used by more than 350 
million individuals and corporations throughout the NAFTA countries.”63
As proof of the chill effect international trade obligations are having 
on the Canadian government, all proposed legislation and/or regulation 
now undergoes routine “trade screening” to ensure compliance with NAF-
TA and OECD provisions.64 This is clear evidence that international trade 
agreements are impacting directly on public policy making. According 
to some proponents of globalization, this effect has been embraced and 
trumpeted as a good thing—as “the Golden Straightjacket,” according 
to New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman.65 Yet from an environ-
mental perspective, such an effect can only be negative. With no mean-
ingful reference or legal recognition in any existing international trade 
agreement to the precautionary principle,66 screening draft legislation 
for its compliance with international trade obligations can only reduce 
the ability of the principle to serve as a basis of environmental policy.
63 Appleton & Associates, Press Release, “First-Ever Lawsuit Against Canadian Government 
Using NAFTA Investor-State Process Brought,” (9 October 1996).
64 M. Lee, Briefing Paper, “Inside the Fortress: Whatʼ’s Going on at the FTAA Negotiations” 
(Ottawa: The Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, April 2001) at 20.
65 “The myths about globalization (4)” The Globe and Mail (16 April 2001) A10.
66 NAFTA does contain several references which provide prima facie support for environmental 
protection in general —e.g.,  Article 2101 (exceptions dealing with the environment) and Article 
1114 (investment and the environment: parties should not lower their environmental standards 
to attract investment). Upon examining state practice, however, these provisions have proven 
to be little more than rhetoric. Similarly, acting on pressure to fulfill a major electoral promise, 
former U.S. President Clinton did initiate negotiation of two NAFTA “side agreements” after the 
original deal had been signed: The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 
(NAAEC) and The North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation (NAALC). However, 
while both of these side agreements are often trumpeted as evidence that NAFTA recognizes 
human rights based concerns, neither side agreement changed the scope of any of the original 
NAFTA provisions; neither required the establishment of common environmental or labour 
standards; neither required any state party to pass new legislation to bring domestic policy into 
line with internationally recognized standards; nor did either side agreement provide for the 
establishment of any supranational institution(s) to oversee these areas.
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VI. CONCLUSION
While the Supreme Court of Canadaʼ’s decision in Spraytech does, on 
its face, provide support for the precautionary principle and its use in 
environmental policy, those who claim that the decision is a turning 
point for environmental protection in Canada ignore a critical factor, 
namely, Canadaʼ’s international trade commitments under agreements 
such as NAFTA. As this paper has illustrated, NAFTA and its Chapter 11 
investment provisions effectively undercut the ability of legislators to 
utilize the precautionary principle when designing and implementing 
environmental policy—a fact that, tragically, can only be a harbinger 
of further environmental degradation both within and beyond Canadaʼ’s 
borders.
